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JARINGAN RANGKAIAN AHLI LEMBAGA PENGARAH DAN KUALITI 
PEROLEHAN DI MALAYSIA 
 
ABSTRAK 
Malaysia menerima kesan yang kritikal daripada krisis kewangan dunia pada 
tahun 1997 yang memberi kesan signifikan kepada pasaran modal negara- negara di 
rantau Asia. Krisis kewangan kepada pasaran baru seperti Malaysia mendedahkan 
keperluan kritikalnya untuk meningkatkan mekanisma tadbir urus korporat. Ciri-ciri 
ahli lembaga pengarah merupakan sebahagian daripada mekanisma tadbir urus 
korporat yang telah menjadi fokus utama untuk mempertingkatkan tadbir urus 
korporat sekaligus mengembalikan keyakinan pelabur ke arah kelestarian pasaran 
modal Malaysia. Kajian lepas telah mengenalpasti salah satu daripada ciri-ciri ahli 
lembaga pengarah merupakan komponen utama yang menjejaskan kualiti perolehan. 
Tadbir urus rangkaian ahli lembaga pengarah menjadi ciri tersirat utama yang kurang 
dikaji sebelum ini.  Kajian ini secara mendalam meneliti hubungkait antara rangkaian 
ahli lembaga pengarah dan kualiti perolehan bagi 745 syarikat tersenarai awam di 
Bursa Malaysia termasuk 4416 ahli lembaga pengarah dalam tahun 2011. Kajian ini 
menggunakan model kualiti terakru Francis, Lafond, Olsson dan Schipper (2005) bagi 
mengukur kualiti perolehan. Kajian ini turut menggabungkan Analisa Rangkaian 
Sosial (SNA) bagi mengukur pemusatan rangkaian di peringkat pengarah dan firma. 
Melalui penggunaan SNA, kajian ini memetakan keseluruhan rangkaian pengarah dan 
firma serta menghasilkan ukuran pemusatan bagi menggambarkan kepentingan 
rangkaian berkenaan. Umumnya, kajian ini mendapati hubungkait negatif dan 
signifikan antara jaringan rangkaian ahli lembaga pengarah dan kualiti perolehan. 
xvi 
Analisa lanjut kajian ini ke atas ukuran pemusatan rangkaian mencadangkan kedua-
dua pengarah Bumiputera dan bukan Bumiputera, pengarah lelaki, warganegara 
Malaysia dan pengarah yang mempunyai hubungan politik membina rangkaian yang 
mengurangkan kualiti perolehan. Kajian ini juga mendapati rangkaian pengarah 
wanita meningkatkan kualiti perolehan manakala rangkaian pengarah warganegara 
asing dan yang tidak mempunyai hubungan politik tidak memberi kesan yang 
signifikan kepada kualiti perolehan. Kajian ini berpendapat bahawa hubungkait negatif 
dan signifikan ke atas kualiti perolehan adalah disebabkan kepentingan status sosial 
yang menjejaskan nilai pemegang saham. Manakala, kesan positif dan signifikan 
adalah disebabkan pengiktirafan amalan etika dan tingkahlaku moral. 
Keseluruhannya, kajian ini menyumbang kepada kajian sedia ada di samping 
methodologi dengan menyediakan bukti serta menggabungkan keupayaan rangkaian 
pengarah dan firma yang menjejaskan amalan tadbir urus korporat sekaligus 
mempengaruhi kualiti pelaporan kewangan. Rangkaian ahli lembaga pengarah 
memerlukan penelitian lebih mendalam daripada kepelbagaian perspektif teori dengan 
mengambilkira konteks institusi serta mekanisma tadbir urus korporat yang lain. 
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BOARD OF DIRECTOR’S NETWORK AND EARNINGS QUALITY IN 
MALAYSIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
Malaysia critically suffered from the world financial crisis in 1997, which 
significantly effects the capital market of all Asian region countries. The financial 
crisis in emerging market like Malaysia revealed the critical need for firm to enhance 
corporate governance mechanism. The board of director characteristics is part of 
corporate governance mechanism, which has been major focus to strengthen firm’s 
corporate governance, thus restore the investor’s confidence towards a sustainable 
Malaysian capital market. Prior empirical had shown that one of the board of director’s 
characteristics is identified as key component affecting the earnings quality. The 
governance of the board of director’s networks becoming key unobservable 
characteristics, which has been less observed in past studies. This study investigates 
the association between board of director’s networks and earnings quality of 745 
public listed firms in Bursa Malaysia, which comprises 4416 directors in 2011. This 
study employs the Francis, Lafond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) accruals quality 
model as to measure the earnings quality and incorporate the Social Network Analysis 
(SNA) to measure the network centrality both at director’s and firm’s level. Using the 
SNA, this study map the entire network of directors and firms and generate the network 
centrality measures to reflect the importance of such network. Generally, this study 
find negative and significant association between the board of director’s network and 
earnings quality. This study extended analysis on network centrality measures based 
suggest that both Bumiputera and Non-Bumiputera, men, Malaysian and politically 
xviii 
connected director’s networks created networks which reduce earnings quality. This 
study finds women director’s networks increases earnings quality while foreign and 
non-politically connected director’s networks has no significant effects to earnings 
quality. This study argue that the negative and significant effects on earnings quality 
is due to the importance of social stature thus harm shareholders value. While the 
positive and significant effects is due to the recognition of ethical and moral behaviour. 
Overall, this study provide contribution to extant literature and methodology by 
evidencing and incorporating the ability of firm’s and director’s networks to affect 
corporate governance practices hence influence financial reporting quality. The board 
of director’s networks need further investigations from diverse theoretical perspectives 
with take into consideration the institutional context as well as other corporate 
governance mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
The board of director’s characteristics has become focal issues affecting firms’ value. 
The role of the board of directors and its association with effective corporate 
governance practices has received considerable attention by not only practitioners and 
regulators but also academicians around the world. The establishment of board of 
director’s in a firm reflect its status as the apex which  oversight firm’s strategic 
decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
The presence of quality directors in a firm is expected to be able to give advice to the 
firm’s management in realising strategic decision. The directors also are in a strategic 
position to monitor firm’s operations as well as management behaviour.  Prior studies 
have examined the board of director’s characteristics which lead to effective monitors 
and advisors (Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011a, 2013) such as independence (Agrawal 
& Knoeber, 1996; Hoitash, 2010; Klein, 2002; Krishnan, Raman, Yang & Yu, 2011), 
accounting and finance expertise and experience (Dhaliwal, Naiker, & Navissi, 2006), 
gender (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001; Burgess & Tharenou, 2002), ethnicity (Che-
Ahmad, Houghton, & Mohamad Yusof, 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Yatim, Kent, 
& Clarkson, 2006), nationality (Ruigrok, Peck, & Tacheva, 2007), and political 
connections (Abdul Wahab & Abdul Rahman, 2009; Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001; Gul, 
2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003).  
2 
In addition, prior studies also has associated the role of the board of directors with 
firm’s ownership structure such as managerial ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Mustapha & Che-Ahmad, 2011b; Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995); institutional 
ownership (Abdul Wahab & Abdul Rahman, 2009; Choi & Seo, 2008; Velury & 
Jenkins, 2006) and family ownership (Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 2009; Wan Hussin, 2009; 
Wang, 2006). The studies on the structure of firm’s ownership relatively indicate the 
significant presence of directors able to influence the firm’s strategic directions and 
performance.  
 
Relatively, a large number of prior studies have focused on the board of directors and 
the role they play in governing firms. The board of directors is presumed theoretically 
as the highest authority in governing the firm (Barnea & Guedj, 2009). However, 
relatively not much about the board of director’s networks has been explored. 
Therefore, established within sociological perspectives, the effect of the board of 
director’s networks of the firms remains less resolute. 
 
Specifically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that 
director with multiple directorships are the most efficient directors which lead to a 
better firm performance. Firm with multiple directorships could utilise the director’s 
various knowledge and skills shared from other successful firms via their shared 
directors. Therefore, the director with multiple directorships are motivated to give 
excellent service to all the connected firms effectively. This becomes an incentive for 
them to ensure firm’s better achievement and performance (Vafeas, 2005).  
 
3 
However, the multiple directorships, to a certain extent, create a controversial debate 
among researcher. The main concern of multiple directorships is the measurable ability 
to be associated with firm’s wealth and value creation (Etheridge, 2012). The multiple 
directorships are a direct measure between two or more firms via the shared directors. 
The direct measurement only manages to evaluate the effect of relationship or interlock 
at first degree (Hashim & Abdul Rahman, 2006; Omer, Shelley, & Tice, 2014a). This 
indicates that there is an existing condition, which limits the multiple directorship 
measurement to capture more rigorous connection among directors or firms.  
 
Also, the direct measurement is argued to be insufficient in measuring the extent of 
more distant firm’s relationships (Kirchmaier & Stathopoulos, 2008; McDonald & 
Westphal, 2003; Stuart & Yim, 2010). The inclusion of indirect network measurement 
is relatively useful and provide great insight on how the board of director’s networks 
improve the firm’s performance (Horton, Millo, & Serafeim, 2012). 
 
The use of social network measurements are to enhance the ability to measure the 
effect of board of director’s direct and indirect relationship with other firms (Borgatti 
& Halgin, 2011; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). The rigorous social network 
measurements potentially sufficient to determine the effects of either direct or indirect 
relationships both at directors or firm’s level. By having an effective relationships or 
connections, firms have the potential to utilise the critical resources which lead to 
increase the firm’s value (Renneboog & Zhao, 2011).  
 
Relatively, the board of director’s networks is a less unobservable board of director’s 
characteristic which potentially overcomes the limitations imposed by corporate 
4 
governance studies, particularly on multiple directorships  (Andres, Van den Bongard, 
& Lehmann, 2013; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). The board of director’s networks 
extensively considers the effect of firms’ networks via the director’s networks  It was 
argued as the central feature of nearly all firms’ economic activities (Larcker, 
Richardson, Seary, & Tuna, 2009; Larcker, So, & Wang, 2013; Renneboog & Zhao, 
2011, 2013).  
 
The board of director’s networks causes certain impact to firm performance, as it is 
determined by fundamental economic, social, and political factors (Ball, Robin, & Wu, 
2003). The board of directors network’s appears to hold fundamental social 
embeddedness1 which leads to the firm’s value creation (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011; 
Granovetter, 1985). It is argued that the observations on governance practices among 
firms are contributed by the effect of board of director’s networks (Bouwman, 2011). 
Therefore, the board of directors’ network potentially generates direct and indirect 
effects to the firm performance. 
 
In social network analysis, anecdotal evidence from the international business 
community reveals the value of connecting relationships established in the past 
regardless the period. For instance, the Malaysian capital market has considered Tan 
Sri Datuk Asmat Bin Kamaludin as a key individual with 35 years of experience 
serving both government and private sectors. His last position in the government was 
the Secretary General of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).  
 
                                                 
1 The concept introduced by sociologist Mark Granovetter which stated that embeddedness is the 
individuals or firms degree level involve in a social network. At firm’s level, the embeddedness involves 
the overlap between social and economic connection both within and between firms (Granovetter, 
1985). 
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During the period as a senior government officer, he has also held a position as Senior 
Economic Counsellor to the European Community in Brussels, committee member for 
Small and Medium Scale Industries Corporation (SMIDEC), Johore Corporation and 
the Malaysian External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE). Extensive and 
recognised experience by industries, especially expertise in international trading, 
earned him several directorships in Malaysian firms in 2011. 
 
Among high profile firms, which appointed him, mostly as chairman, were 
Compugates Holdings Berhad, Lion Industries Corporation Berhad, Malaysian Pacific 
Industries Berhad, Panasonic, Manufacturing Malaysia Berhad, Scomi Group Berhad, 
Scomi Marine Berhad, Symphony House Berhad, TASCO Berhad, UMW Holdings 
Berhad, and YTL Cement Berhad.  
 
In addition, throughout his entire directorship period, he was acquainted with other 
prominent corporate leaders such as former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun 
Musa Hitam; Member of Parliament and former Finance Minister, Tan Sri Nik 
Mohamed Bin Nik Yaacob; Founder of YTL Corporation and 7th richest person in 
Malaysia in 2011, Tan Sri Dato’ Seri (Dr.) Yeoh Tiong Lay. Likewise, the importance 
of past relationships from either the government or corporate sector shown in his 
successful career. 
 
Nevertheless, the established connections between directors implies that it is obvious 
that network is necessary in business world (Barnea & Guedj, 2006). Prior studies have 
associate social networks concepts with firm performance (Dicko & Breton, 2010; 
Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Horton & Serafeim, 2012; Larcker, So, & Wang, 2012; Horton, 
6 
Millo, & Serafeim, 2009; Smith, 2009; Kim, 2005; Larcker et al., 2005b;; Nicholson 
et al., 2004); career outcome (Horton & Serafeim, 2012); compensation and 
remuneration (Brown, Gao, Lee, & Stathopoulos, 2012; Engelberg, Gao, & Parsons, 
2009; Horton et al., 2012; Larcker et al., 2005; Renneboog & Zhao, 2011); corporate 
policies (Fracassi, 2011); accounting standards regulations (Richardson, 2009); and 
other board of director’s behaviour (Barnea & Guedj, 2009; Dey & Liu, 2011; Kim & 
Lu, 2011). 
 
Additionally, this idea also supported by Fan et al. (2011), as current studies are 
establishing the understanding that emerging capital market are actually connected 
through various connections despite being legally independent entities (Allen, Babus, 
& Carletti, 2010). Malaysia, as one of the emerging capital market in Asia provides 
suitable environment to examine the presence and impact of board of director’s 
networks among firms in Malaysia. 
 
A network of firms or a business group is commonly found in a typical emerging 
capital market. The emerging market consists of diversified and legally independent 
firms or business groups of entities operating across industries (Khanna & Yafeh, 
2007). Formally, these networks are created through firm’s ownership structure, such 
as a parent firm that holds the majority shares which enables control of a subsidiary. 
A firms can also be informally connected through social relationships of the firm’s key 
personnel, such as marriage (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2008), family 
relationships, university alumnus, or personal relationships at the workplace (Khanna 
& Thomas, 2008). 
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Hence, the central question of the corporate governance research agenda is to 
understand the impact of board of director’s networks on the firm performance and its 
consequences (Kim, 2005; Nicholson et al., 2004). The focus on new board of director 
characteristics, which is the board of director’s networks, most likely to affect the 
firm’s decision making process, hence affecting the firm’s performance and outcomes 
(Barnea & Guedj, 2009). This shows that the success of any firm relies on the board 
of director’s networks, directly or indirectly, which brings to the board member 
selection and finally appointed as executive or directors (Kirchmaier & Stathopoulos, 
2008). 
 
An example of one of the highest-profile accounting scandals in Malaysia was 
Transmile Group Berhad (Transmile), in which the major reason of its collapse was 
accounting irregularities (Zaimee, 2007). The firm was alleged to have overstated its 
sales revenue. The property, plant, and equipment (PPE) account also appears to be 
fictitious. There was no sufficient evidence to support the amounts in the PPE 
accounts. Regretfully, the payment made by the firm has no supporting payment 
vouchers.   
 
Additionally, the directors were also fined a total of RM 1,888,200.00 and two 
directors were sentenced to jail because of failure to disclose accurate financial 
information on timely manner for year-end 2005 and 2006. Looking at the board 
composition in 2005, the convicted directors were executive directors and were not 
listed as directors in the firm’s annual report in 2006.  
 
8 
The Transmile scandal was an anecdotal evidence which shows direct or indirect 
connections between directors supposed were rich with resources and information 
among them. However, these connections are perhaps seen to be ineffective, as 
Transmile’s directors were finally reprimanded by Bursa Malaysia. Bursa Malaysia 
Securities Berhad publicly reprimanded four of its former directors in 2010.  
 
This study observation identified that the Transmile board of directors consists of a 
key political party leader and federal minister, senior government officer, and directors 
from politically connected firms such as Shangri-La Hotels (Malaysia) Berhad, 
Lafarge Malayan Cement Berhad, PPB Group Berhad, and Focal Aims Berhad. 
Despite Transmile directly connected with resourceful and influential directors, it has 
appeared that little they have done in discharging their duties of monitoring and 
advisory role effectively. 
 
After numerous trials of the convicted directors, Transmile, and authoritative agencies, 
this event finally ended with Transmile delisted from Bursa Malaysia in 2011. This 
episode is one example of how the board of director’s networks may negatively affect 
firms. Anecdotally, it also shows that poor corporate governance not only leads to 
lower quality of financial reporting at a firm level, but also the national level as 
suggested by Norwani, Mohamad, and Tamby Chek (2011). 
 
In the emerging market firm context, firms are actually linked to one another via a 
diversified form of professional and social connections (Fan et al., 2011; Pesämaa, 
Klaesson, & Haahti, 2011; Renneboog & Zhao, 2011). However, the need to 
understand how and why does these organisation connections are formed, governed, 
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and evolve over time is less observed (Fan et al., 2011). Still, the social connections 
are perceived to have value of the firms, as well-connected firms report relatively 
better economic performance (Fracassi, 2011). 
 
As for corporate governance mechanisms, the rules and regulations stated that the 
board of directors is accountable to foster a culture that encourage better corporate 
governance (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2011d). However, the legislation only 
prescribed the minimum level of compliances. Even though the board of directors is 
claimed as an important internal governance mechanism, the empirical evidence 
related to the association of board of directors characteristics and firm performance are 
inconclusive (Bozec, 2005). Ideally, the rules and regulation emphasise that the 
existence of a board of directors is expected to promote better standards, eventually 
leading to a level where firms are able to incorporate it as part of corporate governance 
best practice.  
 
Shareholder and public confidence reinforcement could be restored if the board of 
directors reflects the high level of assurance and accountability beyond the compliance 
of established rules and regulations. The board of director’s integrity level further 
reflects the firm capability as business entities with sufficient information. The 
information secured capable of reducing firm business risks towards the creation of 
sustainable and ethical values.  
 
This study, which could be categorised within a sociological approach, is considering 
the board of directors based on social and relational perspectives. This study also 
attempts to examine the association of board of director’s networks on the firm’s 
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financial reporting quality. The board of directors will almost fully utilise their 
networks in assisting the firm acquire external resources efficiently and effectively 
(Dicko & Breton, 2010). Eventually, this would influence the quality of a firm’s 
reported earnings. 
 
The issue of effective corporate governance mechanism also has become more 
prominent due to the recent economic recession and scandals, which affected most 
countries as well as Asian region. The economic instability due to the Asian financial 
crisis (AFC) had a significant influence on most Asian countries, including Malaysia. 
In order to minimise the negative impact of the AFC, firms critically affected by the 
financial crisis were required to express positive information to investors (Johnson, 
Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000; Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Vichitsarawong, Eng, & 
Meek, 2010). Thus, the weaknesses of corporate governance practices are becoming 
more apparent and highly deliberated due to the AFC (Abdul Rahman & Mohamed 
Ali, 2006; Abdul Wahab, Zain, & James, 2011; Ariff, Ibrahim, & Othman, 2007). 
Additionally,  Fan et al. (2011) and Claessens and Fan (2003), also found that the low 
level of transparency and disclosure quality among Asian publicly listed firms 
contributed to poor corporate governance.  
 
Despite the negative impact of the AFC on Malaysian economy and public 
confidences, the argument is clearly shown that there is still a need for better awareness 
and emphasis of the importance of corporate governance best practices in Malaysia 
(Abd. Hamid, 2008; Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2006; Finance Committee on 
Corporate Governance, 2000).  There is also evidence that the board of directors failed 
to emphasize the ethical values when enforcing corporate governance practices. The 
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board of directors has been found to focus on compliance with regulatory requirements 
explicitly (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2011d).  
 
In Malaysia, there is a need to reinforce public confidence, due to continuous flows of 
funds to Malaysian firms as well as the board of directors, especially after the AFC 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). At the same time, by emphasizing observance of boards on 
the firm’s corporate governance, it is crucial to safeguard firms against unethical 
conduct, mismanagement, and fraudulent activities (Ariff et al., 2007; Securities 
Commission Malaysia, 2011d; Stuart & Yim, 2010). Therefore, the need for advanced 
study of corporate governance is increasing, especially in the Malaysian globalised 
capital market that is competitive and in which scrutiny is intense. 
 
Furthermore, Malaysia, as stressed by Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003), among other East 
Asian countries, provides a useful setting which is generally viewed to have high-
quality accounting standards. However, the institutional structures have created 
opportunity for firms to produce a low-quality financial report, which is embedded 
within the board of directors. Indeed, it suggests that the board of director’s 
characteristics needs to be further examined. Additionally, the board of directors is 
also required to provide well-informed strategic advises and monitoring that cover 
more than short-term financial performance (Global Corporate Governance Forum, 
1997). 
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1.2 Research Aims and Motivations  
There are many reasons why the board of director’s networks in Malaysia deserves 
further examination. First, this thesis aims to advance our understanding and 
perception of the board of director’s networks characteristics and its outcomes. This 
study utilised a more comprehensive board of director’s network dataset than similar 
studies in Malaysia. This is methodologically consistent with prior studies in the 
United States of America (U.S.) and United Kingdom (U.K.) settings, which focusing 
to a whole or large number firms on a network (Etheridge, 2012; Larcker et al., 2013; 
Renneboog & Zhao, 2011). 
 
To date, the current requirements of board director nomination and appointment have 
less considered the governance of director’s networks effects as suggested by Abd. 
Hamid (2011) and  Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad (2012b). In Malaysia, a director 
is permitted to hold a maximum of 25 directorships at a time2.This is larger compared 
to U.S, nine; and Australia (11). In the U.K., the Listing Rules 2012 has not limited 
the number of directorships; however, the U.K. Code of Corporate Governance 
recommended a limit for executive directors of to only one FTSE 100 non-executive 
directorship and the code emphasises that all directors should be able to allocate 
sufficient time to discharge their responsibilities for the firms. The large number of 
directorships permissible in Malaysia relatively reflect the board of director’s 
networks outcomes are ambiguous. 
 
                                                 
2 The 25 directorships include 10 directorships in listed firms and the remaining is in private firms 
(Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad, 2012b) 
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Even though the board of directors perceived to have the power or actually driving the 
firm, a director’s network does perform a critical agenda that propels the Malaysian 
economic growth. Therefore, there is a need to distinguish the board of director’s 
network structural patterns with regard to firm’s earnings quality.  The board of 
director’s networks may be significantly affecting the corporate governance 
effectiveness as well as corporate decision making (Kiel & Nicholson, 2006; 
Renneboog & Zhao, 2011). 
 
The second motivation is that Malaysia provides a unique institutional setting to 
examine the association of board of director’s networks on earnings quality. Malaysia 
signifies an important and appealing platform to study the relationship-based economy 
(Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid, 2006). Information of the board of directors is readily 
available from the annual reports of listed firms in Malaysia, which require the 
disclosure of a profile of each of the directors and specifies the director’s position in 
the firm (Mohamad Nor, Shafie, & Wan Hussin, 2010). The application of the latest 
social network measures and tools, specifically developed by the disciplines of 
sociology and graph theory, are employed to quantify board of director’s networks. 
 
While the studies on board of director’s networks mostly carried out in developed 
countries, this warrant further examination of board of director’s networks in emerging 
markets like Malaysia. The differences of prior studies are that each country is unique 
with regard to the regulatory and cultural frameworks, including Malaysia (Abdullah, 
Mohamad Yusof, & Mohamad Nor, 2010).  
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Prior study has focused on the U.K. and the U.S. firms regarding the association of 
corporate governance mechanisms, specifically board of directors. This thesis also 
aims to document the characteristics and structural pattern of the board of director’s 
networks in Malaysia. This study also examines the practical implications of board of 
director’s networks on firm performance, specifically earnings quality. 
 
Recently, focus has been diverted into the Asian countries setting (Kim, 2005). One 
focus is on the importance of extensive social networks between management and 
board of directors (Fracassi, 2011). Therefore, the integration of social relationship 
studies with regard to board of directors is part of natural extension of corporate 
governance literature (Renneboog & Zhao, 2011; Stuart & Yim, 2010). 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The unclear consequences of board of director’s networks regarding its economic 
impact are therefore an open empirical question. This is due to the fact that most 
empirical network studies emphasis on interpersonal relationships between a specific 
node in a unique setting, for example, between an executive director and chief 
executive director in securing their compensation; and a security analyst and director 
in acquiring information advantages (Engelberg, Gao, & Parsons, 2013; Horton & 
Serafeim, 2012). 
 
The appointment of directors in a board indirectly generates network effects, as the 
nomination committee member is influenced by their interpersonal relationship to 
select a new director. For instance, a well-connected director acquainted with different 
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corporate governance practices of other firms, relatively would lead the firm’s 
corporate governance practices towards the practices of those other firms.  
 
Consequently, there is probably that convergence of corporate governance practice 
could create unnecessary network effects that could detriment firm value (Bouwman, 
2011). Corporate governance practices transfer across firms through the board of 
director’s networks. The corporate governance practices are partly the consequences 
of network effects among firms through their shared directors. Thus, firms are most 
likely to appoint directors from other firms with comparable corporate governance 
practices.  
 
The major collapse of Enron and WorldCom have brought the global attention to the 
consequences of poor corporate governance practice (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; 
Norwani et al., 2011; Zaimee, 2007).  As the highest authority in a firm, the board of 
director is the key to the establishment and implementation of good corporate 
governance practice.  The director’s behaviour and decision, either individually or 
collectively, is crucial in motivating firm’s strategic direction.  
 
In Malaysia, a number of mini-Enron cases also pressured the key participants in the 
local corporate governance, among others the board of directors, to play a strong role 
in preventing accounting scandals from recurring and restoring the public confidence. 
Several Malaysian firms such as Transmile Group Berhad, Megan Media Holdings 
Berhad, Nasioncom Holdings Berhad and Wimems Corporation Berhad blamed due 
to the falsification of their revenue, receivables, and tangible assets (Mahmud, 
Ibrahim, & Pok, 2009). 
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Although extensive studies on board of director’s role have been carried out associated 
with firm’s financial reporting quality , the effect of board of director’s networks on 
firm’s financial reporting quality is still unclear (Larcker et al., 2013). Therefore, this 
study intends to increase understanding the effect of the board of director’s networks  
towards firm’s financial reporting quality. This study also provides empirical evidence 
on the consequence of board of director’s networks on the financial reporting quality 
in order to assist corporate governance regulators as well other policy makers in 
considering the following board of director’s networks. 
 
This study, therefore, offers an attempt to identify the board of director’s networks 
structural pattern at a macro-level associated with firm financial reporting quality. The 
innovation of this study is the construct of the board of director’s professional network 
and measure its relative position in the network. This study, then assesses the board of 
director’s networks centrality and establish its association with firm’s financial 
reporting quality. 
 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
This study investigates whether there is a relationship between the board of director’s 
network and earnings quality of Malaysian publicly listed firms in the post-AFC 
period. As the 5th fastest growing capital market in Asia, Bursa Malaysia plays a major 
role in increasing the market capitalisation growth to reach RM 2.4 trillion (US$ 800 
billion) in 2020 (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2011c).  
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The first research question is to ascertain the existing board of director’s network 
structures. In pursuing this question, this study explores the existing structural pattern 
of the board of director’s network of publicly listed firms. If there are structural 
patterns exist, so, this study would seek to establish whether the relationship between 
the board of director’s network structures and earnings quality significantly differs. 
Therefore, the first research question of this study is: 
 
What are the existing characteristics of board of director’s networks among publicly 
listed firms in Malaysia? 
 
The second research question, assuming that there is significant characteristics 
between the publicly listed firm’s board of director’s networks, is to ascertain whether 
the impact of board of director’s social networks on earnings quality is the same or 
different for all firms. Thus, the second research question of this study is:  
 
What are the effects between the board of director’s networks and firm’s financial 
reporting quality in Malaysia? 
 
This question is important because it helps to understand the board of director’s 
network’s role in representing the shareholders’ interests and influencing firm’s 
earnings quality, as well as the influences that give rise to formation of board of 
director’s networks. 
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This study final question is to ascertain the effects of other corporate governance 
mechanisms to the firm’s financial reporting quality in the presence of the board of 
director’s networks. Thus, the third research question is:  
 
What are the effects of other corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship 
between the board of director’s networks and firm’s financial reporting quality in 
Malaysia? 
 
The lack of consensus of prior studies leads to the emergence of more social and 
relational perspectives on the board of directors’ roles (Dicko & Breton, 2010). The 
roles of individual director as well as the way they are selected will differ (Pesämaa et 
al., 2011). Larger director’s social network are likely empowers the directors and 
enable them to influence the firm’s board of directors (Brown et al., 2012). It also 
could create value through non-information based channel. No matter at what reasons, 
board of director networks must represent something for which firms willing to pay 
for (Engelberg et al., 2013). One way directors gain experiences and knowledge is by 
serving on a firm’s board of directors (Larcker et al., 2005). 
 
Furthermore, board of director’s networks does have significant impacts on a firm’s 
economic performance (Larcker & Tayan, 2010). By exploring further on the board of 
directors’ network, it could bring understand the complexity in which board members 
make decisions (Barnea & Guedj, 2006). Specifically, a less connected firms tend to 
have better financial reporting quality (Dey & Liu, 2011). Therefore, this study intends 
to provide evidence of a causal relationship between the board of director’s social 
networks and the firm’s earnings quality. 
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Pesämaa et al. (2011) showed that the combination of board of directors’ 
characteristics, including networks, proper administration, and firm’s age does affect 
the firm’s performance. This shows that the model receives strong support, which 
indicates that the theory has a significant effect on further verification. The social 
network is important in increasing the director’s monitoring role effectiveness (Dey & 
Liu, 2011). Board of directors with insufficient professional or social connections are 
less likely to exert control over firm’s strategic decisions on behalf of shareholders 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). 
 
The board of directors’ network has an impact on the firm’s performance (Pesämaa et 
al., 2011). It is the board of director’s personal networks that enable them to access 
firm’s resources (Smith, 2009). The needs of the board of director’s networks may be 
manipulated to enhance firm’s strategic issues through the valuable information flow 
within the network. However, there is also evidence that information flows through 
networking could be irrelevant to the firms; thus, the directors appointed will not able 
to perform effectively (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). 
 
Commonly, possible reasons for the increasing of studies in this area are that the board 
of directors is in a position to exercise at least a minimum control over the firm’s 
strategic directions. Secondly, board members are overlapping where a firm shares at 
least one director on the board. Thus, the board of directors has been the apex for 
research focus in management sciences (Durbach & Parker, 2009). The board of 
directors’ network with other directors allegedly has an impact on the director’s 
independence and thus may have influence over board decisions (Larcker et al., 2005). 
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1.5 Research Objectives 
In achieving the goal of this study, the objectives of this study are: 
1. To examine the current patterns of board of director’s networks by mapping 
the board of director’s networks structural networks patterns within and 
outside the firm. The first objective is to fill gaps in the literature; specifically, 
to examine the existing director’s structural network patterns established using 
social network analysis (SNA).  
2. To examine the association between the board of director’s networks and the 
quality of firm’s financial reporting. The second objective provides an 
explanation of the director’s network phenomenon and the effect on the firm’s 
earnings quality, supported by theoretical arguments offered by the SNA 
approach. Regardless of the relationship, a better understanding of board of 
director’s networks and its association to firm’s financial reporting is required. 
Eventually, it is expected to be of interest not only academicians, but also to 
practitioners as well as regulators. 
3. To determine the effects of other corporate governance mechanism to firm’s 
financial reporting quality in the presence of the board of director’s networks 
effects. This third objective is to provide additional support on whether there 
any differences in firm’s earnings quality affected by corporate governance 
mechanisms in the presence of the board of director’s networks. 
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1.6 Contribution of the Study 
This study is significant from several aspects of the contribution to methodological, 
theoretical, policy maker, practitioner, as well as literature factors. The contributions 
are as follows: 
 
1. Methodological 
This study employs social network analysis (SNA) incorporated existing tools to 
examine the association between the board of director’s networks and firm’s 
financial reporting quality. The use of SNA enable capturing and mapping the 
structural pattern of entire networks, both at the director’s and the firm’s levels. 
The differences between networks signify that there are different effects on 
financial reporting quality. Further, SNA application is able to derive network 
centrality measures, which are important to identify and explain network patterns 
at both director’s and firm’s level.  
 
 
2. Policy makers 
The study addresses the issue of the effectiveness role of the board of directors.  
Malaysia provides an interesting platform for examining this issue, as from 
MCCG 2000 until 2012 includes the establishment of a well-balanced and 
effective board of director. It also highlighted the separation of power between the 
chairmen and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to ensure higher quality financial 
reports are conveyed to the users of the financial statement.  
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While most prior studies on board of director’s characteristics focus mainly on the 
role of board independence and CEO duality, this study also examines their 
professional and social networks to effectively acquire access and resources in 
assisting a higher quality financial reporting process. Although the Revised 
MCCG 2007 does not state specifically the criteria for networks, this study 
attempts to gather evidence through various network proxies, such as academic 
background, past and present employment or directorships, or other social club 
memberships and events. 
 
Additionally, the code also requires non-executive directors to have the necessary 
skills, experience, and be a person of calibre and credibility in order to bring 
independent judgment to the board. Further, recent changes in the revised MCCG 
2012 show greater clarity on the nominating committee role, which consists 
exclusively of non-executive directors, to recommend candidates for directorship. 
They are required to consider, among other factors, skills, knowledge, expertise, 
and experience of candidates so that the appointed directors will be able to 
discharge their functions more effectively.  
 
3. Practitioners 
Most Malaysian firms have appointed their directors from various ethnic, 
religious, gender or academic works, or social backgrounds. The examination of 
their influence over the quality of financial reporting quality will provide a new 
direction for the sociological aspects of corporate governance research. This 
would be an interesting issue that has a significant impact on business ethics, 
corporate practices, and the behaviour of board members in Malaysian 
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corporations in terms of ethnicities characteristics (Ow-Yong & Kooi Guan, 
2000). 
 
This study considers Malaysia as an appealing case because it has identified 
important relationships between politicians and firms before capital controls are 
imposed (Jomo, 1998). Politically connected firms may generally differ in 
unobservable ways relative to unconnected firms, but in the Malaysian data it is 
possible also to examine variation in earnings quality within the set of politically 
connected firms (Johnson & Mitton, 2003). 
 
4. Theoretical 
To date, a relatively small number of studies has been conducted comparing the 
board of directors’ networks of publicly listed firms in Malaysia. Thus, this study 
would ascertain the significant differences between the board of director’s 
structure networks for publicly listed firms and through the empirical results, 
whether the differences are reflected in firm earnings quality. Thus, the study 
contributes by providing insight into the association between the board of 
director’s network variables and earnings quality in Malaysian publicly listed 
firms and further explores whether this relationship depends on the type of 
directors’ networks. 
 
This study is also an evaluation of applicable main theory sought to elucidate the 
trend and pattern of the board of director’s networks and its association with the 
firm’s financial reporting quality. This study mainly attempts to reduce the 
knowledge gap by introducing the effect of board of director’s networks on 
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financial reporting quality using the analysis of accruals quality in Malaysia.  It 
adds to recent literature showing the links between the board of director’s network 
and earnings quality, but in a different institutional setting.  
 
Despite legislative reforms in corporate governance structure, the relationship 
between the board of director’s networks and earnings quality remains a relatively 
unexplored research issue. Thus, investigation of the association between the 
board of director’s structures and the quality of reported earnings in different 
institutional settings, specifically for a developing country such as Malaysia, 
provides interesting evidence of this aspect of corporate governance research. 
Most prior studies linking institutional features and earnings quality in the East 
Asian market are cross country studies  of a relatively young market (Ball, 
Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Foo & Mat Zain, 2010). 
 
Further, relatively few similar studies look into the same approach in an emerging 
market such as Malaysia. Prior studies more focusing on developed countries such 
as U.S., U.K. and Australia. As mentioned in the previous section, this study 
would determine whether there are any significant differences on the board of 
director’s structural network pattern. This study also attempts to determine, 
through the empirical, whether these differences mirrored in firm financial 
reporting quality. Thus, this study contributes by providing insights into the 
association between the board of director’s networks and financial reporting 
quality of Malaysian firms and further explores if this relationship depends the 
uniqueness of director’s networks characteristics. 
 
